OptimizelyOPTIMJACKSupply Chain AttackTPRMIOCs
14 views

Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack (OPTIMJACK): Full Analysis, IOCs and Victim List

By ScruteXPublished

What is the Optimizely supply-chain attack?

The Optimizely supply-chain attack, tracked as OPTIMJACK, is a 16 November 2026 incident in which an attacker added malicious JavaScript to Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects. Optimizely's CDN served that code to visitors of 178 organisations for up to 17 hours. It skimmed payment cards, swapped crypto wallet addresses, stole cookies and screenshots, and delivered iOS exploit kits.

Key facts

FactDetail
Incident nameOPTIMJACK (Optimizely Web supply-chain attack)
Date16 November 2026, 04:21 to 21:52 UTC
Vendor and productOptimizely Web Experimentation, component "Snippet Delivery"
Attack vectorVulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow used to write code into customer Project JavaScript (projectJS)
Deliverycdn.optimizely.com and customer self-hosted snippet paths
Organisations affected178 (188 infected snippets of 1,611 checked)
PayloadCrypto clipper on 8 chains, Luhn-validated card skimmer, cookie and screenshot theft, iOS exploit kits (Coruna, DarkSword)
Confirmed lossesAbout $7,040 in crypto received by attacker wallets by 19:25 UTC
Threat actorUnattributed, financially motivated
Vendor statusFixed; Optimizely status page in "Monitoring" since 17 November 2026, 01:02 UTC
Scrutex severityCritical

Key takeaways

  1. No customer server was breached. The code ran inside a vendor script every affected site had chosen to trust.
  2. Content Security Policy allowlists, consent managers and vendor reputation all passed the malicious code.
  3. Card fields inside payment provider iframes (Stripe Elements, Adyen) were out of reach. Card fields on the merchant's own page were not.
  4. Absence from the public victim list does not clear you. The list comes from external sweeps and the real number is likely higher.
  5. Staging, QA and preview sites were infected at 8 organisations because they shared the production Optimizely project.

Updates

DateUpdate
17-11-2026 01:02 UTCOptimizely confirms the incident on its status page. Status: Monitoring.
16-11-2026 21:52 UTCOne of 188 infected snippets still carries the loader (TalkTalk). All others cleaned.
16-11-2026 13:43 UTCCard skimmer added to the payload.
16-11-2026 04:21 UTCFirst injection seen, on the BBC's snippet.

What happened in the Optimizely supply-chain attack?

An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. Optimizely's status page states exactly that: an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Reporting on the vendor's response describes the flaw as sitting in the account signup flow.
The attacker changed one field, Project JavaScript. Everything else in each customer's snippet stayed intact. Because the file still came from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's certificate, every affected browser treated the payload as trusted.
This was not CDN cache poisoning. Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given. The malicious code was saved into customer project configuration and compiled into each snippet like any normal change.

What Optimizely has said

  • Cause: an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation.
  • Remediation: the vulnerability is fixed, injected code removed, protections added to stop unauthorised code being delivered, and affected user accounts secured.
  • Further actions reported: the vulnerable signup path blocked, sessions ended, tokens revoked, affected accounts reset, code delivery blocked at Cloudflare and affected customers notified.
  • Scope: "some customer projects". Optimizely has not published a count, a project list or per-customer exposure windows.
  • Customer instructions: none on the status page.

What is still unknown

  • How one flaw gave write access to so many unrelated customer projects.
  • How long the flaw existed before 16 November.
  • Each customer's exposure window. Customers should request their own project modification times.
Optimizely disclosed a separate breach in February 2026 after a voice-phishing attack (suspected ShinyHunters). No link to OPTIMJACK has been shown.

How does Optimizely Web work, and why did browsers trust the code?

Optimizely Web works by having each customer load a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's CDN, for example https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript (projectJS). projectJS is custom code the customer writes in the Optimizely dashboard, and it runs on every page that loads the snippet.
Some customers serve the snippet from their own domain, such as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.
This is the code the attacker added to Zoom's snippet:
The try/catch wrapper means a failure stays silent and the customer's experiments keep working, so nothing visibly breaks.

The three loader variants

VariantHow it worksWhy it matters
1. Plain script tagLoads https://1688360[.]cc/track.jsUsed in most snippets
2. Base64 with atob()Same URL hidden in Base64A search for "1688360.cc" will not find it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned, then re-infected with this variant, so the attacker still had write access during cleanup
3. Inline payload with eval()Full copy of the payload runs if 1688360[.]cc is blockedDefeats a CSP that blocks the domain but allows unsafe-eval
Consent tools did not stop it either. A consent manager controls when a script runs, not what it contains.

What did the malicious code do?

The payload ran in two stages. Stage 1 hit every visitor. Stage 2 targeted iPhone and iPad users.

Stage 1: track.js (about 30 KB, rebuilt 26 times)

  • Crypto clipper: replaced wallet addresses for BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, SOL, TON, LTC, BCH and DOGE. It validated checksums before swapping, rescanned the page every 50 ms on pages containing words such as wallet, deposit or send, and rewrote text, form inputs, links and QR images.
  • Hooks: copy events, clipboard APIs, navigator.share, window.open, fetch, XHR and Function.prototype.call/apply.
  • Card skimmer (from 13:43 UTC): wrapped fetch, XHR and form submits, kept Luhn-valid card numbers with expiry and CVV, and de-duplicated with cc_ keys in sessionStorage. It could not read cross-origin hosted fields such as Stripe Elements or Adyen iframes.
  • Data theft: rendered the page to JPEG with html2canvas and sent it with the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie and up to 20 swapped addresses.
  • Exfiltration: posts to /hit.php and /card.php as text/plain or through sendBeacon, which avoids CORS preflight.

Stage 2: iOS exploit routing

iPhone, iPad and iPod visitors also loaded two boot.js router scripts from .icu domains, tagged data-channel-code="02111110". The routers picked an exploit kit by iOS version.
iOS versionExploit kit and path
iOS 13 to 17Coruna: /A8/, /JIUJIU888/index.js
iOS 18.xDarkSword: /B9/, /D11/, /D12/
iOS 26Fingerprinting chain: /C10/
iOS 18.6 or earlierHidden iframe to /JIUJIU888/weifile.html; the page reloads every 60 seconds to retry
Telemetry posted to l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu/api/iptj. Devices on iOS 18.7.3 or later, or 26.3 or later, are patched.

Which companies were affected by the Optimizely attack?

178 organisations across 20 sectors carried the injected loader. Named organisations include Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and Optimizely itself. Salesforce disabled Optimizely across preview and production. Equifax suspended the integration while it audited logs.

Scrutex analysis of the victim list

Scrutex mapped every affected organisation to its sector, parent group, market and the hosts that carried the code.
FindingCountWhy it matters
Organisations affected178Real total likely higher
Infected domains and hosts264Includes unpublished extra domains
Distinct parent groups113Several brands share one group account
HSBC group entities12Largest single group, from Mexico to Vietnam and Egypt
Organisations with a staging, QA or preview host infected8Test sites share the production project and get less monitoring
Organisations with a sign-in or account host infected5Equifax sign-in, Optimizely login, ASPCA secure donations: the highest-value cookie theft
Organisations with a self-hosted snippet path2Scheels and Vodafone Australia: own domain, same poisoned content
Banking and finance organisations32Largest sector
By region, based on each organisation's domains: Global / US 122, APAC 23, Europe 21, Americas 10, Middle East and Africa 2 ("Global / US" covers generic .com, .org and .us domains).
For readers in India and Malaysia: Crocs India is the only .in site on the list. HSBC Malaysia (including HSBC Amanah) and Levi's Malaysia carried the code.

Full list of affected organisations, by sector

Banking & Finance (32): Paychex, HSBC US, Equifax, SmartAsset, HSBC Hong Kong, ABN AMRO, TaxAct, HSBC Mexico, HSBC Singapore, NetCredit, Associated Bank, S-Pankki, Equifax Canada, Equifax UK, The Work Number (Equifax), Funding Circle, HSBC Australia, CashNetUSA, OnDeck, ICS Cards, HSBC UAE, HSBC Malaysia, Rest Super, HSBC Taiwan, HSBC Vietnam, HSBC Egypt, HSBC Philippines, SmartAdvisor Match (SmartAsset), Compare Club, ABN AMRO Lease, Energy Scout, Hang Seng Investment.
Technology & SaaS (23): Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab, Optimizely, Mixpanel, Typeform, InMotion Hosting, Wasabi, Perforce / Zend / Puppet, Tableau, Hootsuite, Smartsheet, MuleSoft, Thales / Imperva, Tricentis, Web Hosting Hub, QR Code Generator, ServiceChannel, Brandfolder, Intelex, Enverus, Accruent.
Retail & Fashion (20): IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle, Scheels, Ariat, American Girl, StackSocial, Crocs India, Levi's Japan, Todd Snyder, Levi's Indonesia, Just Russel, Loloi Rugs, Levi's Australia, Levi's Malaysia, Levi's Philippines, Levi's Singapore, Levi's Korea, Levi's New Zealand.
Streaming & Entertainment (12): Peacock, D&D Beyond, Wizards of the Coast, NOW TV, Zattoo, Crave, Starz, SkyShowtime, Bravo, SeaWorld, WOW (Sky Deutschland), NOW Italia.
News & Media (10): CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR, CTV News, Fox Sports, BNN Bloomberg / CP24, TSN, Top Gear, BBC Earth.
Airlines & Travel (9): Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines, Transavia, Air France-KLM, KLM Netherlands, Trafalgar, Contiki, Insight Vacations, The Travel Corporation, Costsaver.
Healthcare & Pharma (8): Invisalign, Takeda, Covetrus, iTero (Align), Covetrus Pharmacy, myCovetrus, RaySafe (Fluke), Takeda Oncology.
Industrial & Manufacturing (8): Fluke, eMaint (Fluke), Fluke Networks, Vaillant Germany, Fluke Process Instruments, Fluke Biomedical, Landauer, Vaillant Spain.
Telecoms (7): Virgin Media, Virgin Media O2, Vodafone Australia, O2, TPG Telecom, Mint Mobile, TalkTalk.
Crypto & Trading (6): Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers, Betashares.
Insurance (6): Asurion / uBreakiFix, Mutual of Omaha, Admiral, Securian Financial, eRenterPlan, AKA (Danish unemployment fund).
Property & Real Estate (6): Buildium (managebuilding.com), Loft Living apartments, Buildium, HireAHelper, Flytte.no (and sister comparison sites), MovingPlace.
Food & Hospitality (5): Restaurant ordering sites (order.online), Heineken, Home Chef, Starbucks Canada, Cinnabon.
Home & Smart Home (5): Resideo, Honeywell Home, myQ (Chamberlain), Chamberlain, First Alert.
Nonprofit & Civic (4): Change.org, ASPCA, UNICEF USA, DonorsChoose.
Gambling (4): Betsson, PokerStars, tombola, Betfred.
Professional Services (4): Freshfields, CohnReznick, Baringa, Cro Metrics.
Logistics & Shipping (3): ShipStation / ShipEngine, Stamps.com, ShipEngine.
Automotive (3): Lucid Motors, O'Brien Glass, Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others).
Education (3): Walden University, Perlego, Chamberlain University.

Earlier wave, not counted in the 178

Between 13 and 16 November, the same injector (webshell[.]lol/get.js) reached sites through other third-party scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media. Affected sites included securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaXL and foxsports.com. Fox Sports also appears in the Optimizely list.

Optimizely attack timeline

All times UTC.
Date / timeEvent
18-03-2026TRON wallet later hard-coded in the payload is created
17-09-2026Injector webshell[.]lol first seen on Turkish websites, delivered through an SEO backlink panel script on linkforge[.]cc
28-10-2026Coruna telemetry domain l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu registered
09-11-2026 17:52iOS router domains 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu registered
12-11-20265vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu already serving the Coruna landing page /A8/a.html
13 to 16-11-2026Earlier wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts
16-11-2026 02:21Last clean capture of the BBC snippet
16-11-2026 04:21First Optimizely injection seen: BBC snippet loading webshell[.]lol
16-11-2026 04:28 to 05:23TLS certificates issued for 1688360[.]cc; domain registered 05:23:08
16-11-2026 08:10First track.js build (crypto clipper only); live on bbc.com by 08:28
16-11-2026 11:20Zoom snippet modified
16-11-2026 13:03 to 13:05Stolen USDC on Ethereum swept to an exchange deposit address
16-11-2026 13:180.0761 BTC (about $4,970) received in one payment
16-11-2026 13:43Card skimmer added to track.js
16-11-2026 16:38Second iOS router batch registered: eil786npto9u5bq, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1, gm38duxoihbmy5o (.icu)
16-11-2026 17:13 to 17:57Second iOS host wired in; Coruna iframe added for iOS 18.6 and earlier; final build Last-Modified 17:56:07
16-11-2026 19:24 to 19:59Sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected; about $7,040 in crypto received by 19:25
16-11-2026 20:41 to 21:07Cleanup: Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07
16-11-2026 21:3241 snippets still infected
16-11-2026 21:521 of 188 still infected (TalkTalk)
17-11-2026 01:02Optimizely confirms the incident

Who is behind OPTIMJACK?

OPTIMJACK is unattributed. No group or country has been named, and Optimizely describes the actor only as an unauthorised party. Scrutex assesses the operator as financially motivated, well prepared and fast-moving. Confidence in any link to a known group is low.
AttributeAssessment
MotivationFinancial: crypto theft, card data, session cookies. The iOS chain fits the same goal, as the Coruna kit has been used for mass crypto theft
PreparationWallet created March 2026; injector in use from September 2026; two batches of disposable .icu routers registered ahead of use
HostingGoogle Cloud instances in us-central1, Hong Kong and Singapore
Tempo26 payload builds in under 10 hours and a new router batch mid-attack
Operator artefactsPath and channel names JIUJIU888, weifile and BIGNIAO, numeric C2 domain 1688360[.]cc, affiliate-style channel code 02111110. The channel code suggests the iOS kits are rented or shared under an affiliate model

Coruna exploit kit lineage

The Coruna loader in this campaign is byte-identical to one seen in research published in October 2026. The kit has moved between very different operators:
  1. A commercial surveillance vendor's customer (original use).
  2. UNC6353, suspected Russian espionage activity in Ukraine.
  3. UNC6691, a Chinese financially motivated cluster running mass crypto theft.
  4. OPTIMJACK. Shared tooling does not prove a shared operator, so the link to UNC6691 is low confidence.

Operator infrastructure

ComponentHostLocation
C2 (track.js, hit.php, card.php)1688360[.]cc, 136.113.106[.]136Google Cloud us-central1
iOS routers, batch of 9 November5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, 34.96.213[.]201Google Cloud Hong Kong
iOS routers, batch of 16 Novembereil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu, 34.87.36[.]58Google Cloud Singapore

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

OPTIMJACK used 13 MITRE ATT&CK techniques across 8 tactics.
TacticTechniqueHow it was used
Resource developmentT1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: DomainsDisposable .icu routers and 1688360[.]cc
Initial accessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationOptimizely signup flow vulnerability
Initial accessT1195 Supply Chain CompromiseMalicious code inside a trusted vendor snippet
Initial accessT1189 Drive-by CompromiseVisitors infected by loading the page
ExecutionT1059.007 JavaScriptLoader and track.js run in the browser
ExecutionT1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionCoruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits
Defence evasionT1027 / T1140 Obfuscated Files, DeobfuscateBase64 URL with atob(), inline eval() fallback
Credential accessT1539 Steal Web Session CookieUp to 8,000 characters of cookies
CollectionT1056.003 Web Portal CaptureCard skimmer on forms, fetch and XHR
CollectionT1115 Clipboard DataCopy and clipboard hooks
CollectionT1113 Screen Capturehtml2canvas screenshots
ExfiltrationT1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel/hit.php, /card.php, sendBeacon
ImpactT1565.002 Transmitted Data ManipulationWallet address swapping in pages and QR codes

OPTIMJACK indicators of compromise

All 55 indicators. Domains and IPs are defanged; replace [.] with . before importing. Validate before blocking, and block domains including subdomains.

Network: domains

TypeIndicatorContextFirst seen (UTC)Severity
Domain1688360[.]ccPrimary C2: /track.js, /hit.php, /card.php, /html2canvas.min.js16-11-2026 05:23Critical
Domain5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuiOS router (/boot.js, /A8/ Coruna landing page)09-11-2026 17:52Critical
Domainp55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuiOS router, batch of 09-11; same certificates and IPs as the kit09-11-2026 17:52High
Domaineil786npto9u5bq[.]icuiOS router: /JIUJIU888/weifile.html, /JIUJIU888/index.js, Coruna and iOS 26 pages16-11-2026 16:38Critical
Domain1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icuiOS router, batch of 16-1116-11-2026 16:38High
Domaingm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icuiOS router, batch of 16-1116-11-2026 16:38High
Domainl7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuCoruna telemetry (POST /api/iptj)28-10-2026High
Domainje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuFallback C2 hard-coded in boot.jsn/aHigh
Domainq1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icuFallback C2 in boot.js; no longer resolvingn/aMedium
Domainios-hack[.]icuFallback C2 in boot.jsn/aHigh
Domainwebshell[.]lolInjector (/get.js); earlier wave and first BBC injection17-09-2026High
Domainlinkforge[.]ccSEO backlink panel script that carried the injector17-09-2026Medium

Network: IP addresses

TypeIndicatorContextFirst seen (UTC)Severity
IPv4136.113.106[.]136Hosts 1688360.cc C2; Google Cloud us-central116-11-2026Critical
IPv434.96.213[.]201iOS router batch of 09-11; Google Cloud Hong Kong09-11-2026High
IPv434.87.36[.]58iOS router batch of 16-11; Google Cloud Singapore16-11-2026High

Network: URLs

TypeIndicatorContextFirst seen (UTC)Severity
URLhxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.jsStage 1 payload (rebuilt 26 times)16-11-2026 08:10Critical
URLhxxps://1688360[.]cc/hit.phpExfiltration: screenshot, cookies, page URL, swapped addresses16-11-2026Critical
URLhxxps://1688360[.]cc/card.phpCard data exfiltration (fields n, e, c, u)16-11-2026 13:43Critical
URLhxxps://1688360[.]cc/html2canvas.min.jsScreenshot library pulled by the payload16-11-2026High
URLhxxps://l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu/api/iptjiOS exploit telemetry (POST)n/aHigh
URLhxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.jsInjector script17-09-2026High
URLhxxps://cdn.confiant-integrations[.]net/gptprebidnative/202611121858/wrap.jsExtra delivery route seen on a news siten/aMedium
URLhxxps://www.ae[.]com/resources/aa2a454dda92a6d073ca760a2537f00c14d00114d3583Extra delivery route seen on a retail siten/aMedium

Network: paths

TypeIndicatorContextFirst seen (UTC)Severity
URL path/A8/a.htmlCoruna landing page (iOS 13 to 17)12-11-2026High
URL path/JIUJIU888/index.jsCoruna stagen/aHigh
URL path/JIUJIU888/weifile.htmlHidden iframe for iOS 18.6 and earlier16-11-2026 17:13High
URL path/B9/DarkSword route (iOS 18.x)n/aHigh
URL path/D11/DarkSword route (iOS 18.x)n/aHigh
URL path/D12/DarkSword route (iOS 18.x)n/aHigh
URL path/C10/Fingerprinting chain (iOS 26)n/aMedium
URL path/boot.jsiOS router loader on .icu hostsn/aHigh

File hashes (SHA-256)

TypeIndicatorContextFirst seen (UTC)Severity
SHA-256617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3track.js, first capture16-11-2026High
SHA-256814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0ftrack.js, 17:13 UTC build16-11-2026 17:13High
SHA-256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40track.js, final build (Last-Modified 17:56:07)16-11-2026 17:56High
SHA-2562f69879f1c5bdfe9c075ef67ddb6405afe992aff89dcf42863567f83237d3ba6boot.js on eil786npto9u5bq router16-11-2026High

Attacker wallets

TypeIndicatorContextFirst seen (UTC)Severity
BTC19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kWClipper destination. About 0.083 BTC received on 16-11, including 0.0761 BTC at 13:1816-11-2026High
ETH / EVM0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884eClipper destination (ETH, BSC and EVM chains). USDC swept to an exchange deposit address 13:03 to 13:0516-11-2026High
TRONTHvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxaClipper destination. Wallet in use since March 202618-03-2026High
SOLFVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5nClipper destinationn/aHigh
TONUQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09pClipper destinationn/aHigh
TON (raw)0:2033556a49942224b486e70fa8beeaeae4265dc4b10adffec2326c002d30397bSame TON wallet in raw formn/aHigh
LTCltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5Clipper destination. About 17 LTC received16-11-2026High
BCHqzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58Clipper destinationn/aHigh
DOGEDBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5Clipper destinationn/aHigh

Browser and code artefacts

TypeIndicatorContextFirst seen (UTC)Severity
JS globalwindow._k7Set by track.jsn/aHigh
JS globalwindow.__k7bSet by track.jsn/aHigh
JS globalwindow._ccSet by track.js (card skimmer)n/aHigh
JS globalwindow._qxcSet by track.jsn/aMedium
JS globalwindow._shotSet by track.js (screenshot)n/aMedium
Storage keysessionStorage cc_*Card skimmer de-duplication keysn/aHigh
HTML attributedata-channel-code="02111110"On injected boot.js script tags (iOS loader)n/aHigh
Channel codeBIGNIAOCoruna telemetry channel coden/aMedium
Code stringatob(Base64 loader variant inside projectJSn/aMedium
Code stringeval(Inline payload fallback variant inside projectJSn/aMedium
Code string1688360Plain loader stringn/aHigh

How to check whether your site was affected

  1. Inspect every Optimizely project. Review projectJS and all experiment custom code, including self-hosted snippet endpoints. Look for atob(, eval( and any loader you did not write. A search for "1688360" alone will miss variants 2 and 3.
  2. Fix your own exposure window. Record your snippet's Last-Modified header and ask Optimizely for your projects' modification times.
  3. Search logs back to 16-11-2026 00:00 UTC. Proxy, DNS, WAF, RUM and CSP violation reports, for every host in the IOC tables. A blocked request still proves the code ran.
  4. Review write access. List every user, API token and integration that can edit Optimizely projects. Remove anything unexpected.
  5. Crawl your own pages. Check for the window._k7 and window.__k7b globals and cc_ sessionStorage keys in a headless browser.
  6. Run a canary test. Paste a test wallet address on a staging page carrying the snippet and compare what is submitted. The payload is keyword gated, so an obvious test page may not trigger it.

What should you do now?

Within 24 hours

  1. If you have not verified your snippet, pause Optimizely on checkout, login and wallet pages.
  2. Rotate Optimizely user credentials, API tokens and webhook secrets.
  3. Block the IOCs after validation.
  4. Invalidate sessions and rotate any secret held in a non-HttpOnly cookie for users active on 16 November.
  5. Treat cards typed into your own form fields on 16 November as compromised. Brief your acquirer and card issuers and plan customer notification.
  6. Crypto platforms: add the attacker wallets to transaction screening and review outbound transfers made on 16 November.

Within 7 days

  1. Tighten CSP: a restrictive script-src, no unsafe-eval, deliberate use of strict-dynamic, and a narrow connect-src.
  2. Run CSP in Report-Only alongside enforcement to catch new script hosts and data destinations.
  3. Remove non-essential third-party tags from checkout, login and account pages.
  4. Reconcile card and crypto support tickets from 16 to 18 November against the exposure window.
  5. Organisations in India: assess the CERT-In 6-hour reporting requirement if visitor data was affected.

Structural fixes

  1. Move card capture into cross-origin hosted fields from your payment provider.
  2. Meet PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1: an authorised inventory of every payment-page script, and tamper detection on page content.
  3. Do not rely on Subresource Integrity for Optimizely: the snippet changes on every publish. Monitor the content instead.
  4. Add third-party script owners to vendor risk reviews, with change alerting on what each script loads.

Advice for your customers

  1. Check crypto transfers made on 16 November against the address on the wallet or hardware-wallet screen, not the copied value.
  2. Watch card statements and report unknown charges.
  3. Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or 26.3 or later.
  4. If compromise is suspected, reboot, change passwords stored in the keychain and move funds to a fresh wallet. High-risk users should consider Lockdown Mode.

Are you exposed?

Check these five things. All of them are answerable from your own systems today.
  • ☐ Does any page you own load an Optimizely snippet, from cdn.optimizely.com or from a path on your own domain such as /js/<id>.js?
  • ☐ Did your snippet's Last-Modified header change on 16-11-2026, and has Optimizely given you your project's modification times?
  • ☐ Does your Content Security Policy still allow unsafe-eval, or allow connect-src to any host?
  • ☐ Are card fields on your checkout rendered on your own page rather than inside your payment provider's hosted iframe?
  • ☐ Do your UAT, staging or preview sites share the production Optimizely project, and does anyone monitor them?

What Scrutex finds here

Scrutex fingerprints the technologies running on each of your internet-facing hosts, so it can list every site that loads an Optimizely snippet, including the staging hosts and self-hosted paths nobody put in the asset register. It matches your vendor register against active incidents, so a vendor compromise reaches your team as a finding against named assets rather than as a news headline. It also maps campaign indicators such as the OPTIMJACK C2 and wallet set to your sector, so you know which IOCs to block today.
Scrutex sees what your public pages load from the outside. It does not run inside your visitors' browsers, so it cannot prove what an individual session executed on 16 November. Your own CSP and RUM logs answer that.

What that looks like

Illustrative example. Domains and project IDs redacted.

Which of your sites load Optimizely?

Create a free ScruteX account with your domain and see every internet-facing host that loads a third-party script such as Optimizely, including staging and self-hosted paths. Free tier, no credit card, no agent to install.

If third-party vendors are your problem: Vendor Insights, which tracks incidents at the suppliers in your register and ties them to your assets.
If you need the indicators in your controls today: Threat Insights, which maps active campaigns and IOCs to your sector.
Go deeper: Vendor security assessment template, for adding script-level questions to your next vendor review.
Go sideways: External attack surface management best practices, because the staging sites in this incident are the assets most registers miss.

FAQ

What is the Optimizely supply-chain attack? The Optimizely supply-chain attack is a 16 November 2026 incident in which an attacker abused a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. Optimizely's CDN served it to visitors of 178 organisations, where it skimmed cards, swapped crypto addresses, stole cookies and screenshots, and delivered iOS exploit kits.
What is OPTIMJACK? OPTIMJACK is the name of the campaign that hijacked Optimizely snippets. It refers to the injected loader and the track.js payload served from 1688360[.]cc.
Which companies were affected by the Optimizely breach? 178 organisations, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and Optimizely itself. Banking and finance is the largest sector with 32 organisations.
Was my site affected if it is not on the public list? Not necessarily safe. The public list comes from external sweeps of 1,611 snippets, and the real number is likely higher. Check your own projectJS and snippet history.
How long were websites exposed? Up to about 17 hours. The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on 16 November 2026, and all but one snippet was clean by 21:52 UTC.
Does Content Security Policy stop this kind of attack? Only partly. A CSP that allowlists cdn.optimizely.com lets the loader run. A tight connect-src and a policy without unsafe-eval would have blocked the data theft and the inline fallback.
Were Stripe and Adyen payment forms affected? No. Hosted payment fields inside cross-origin iframes were out of the skimmer's reach. Card fields rendered directly on the merchant's own page were exposed.
Who is behind OPTIMJACK? No group has been named. The operator is financially motivated and reused the Coruna iOS exploit kit, which has been linked to other clusters, including UNC6691. Scrutex rates any attribution as low confidence.
Is Optimizely safe to use now? Optimizely says the vulnerability is fixed and protections are in place. Until it publishes the root cause and per-project exposure times, keep the snippet off checkout, login and wallet pages and review projectJS after every publish.